Against Understanding (as a Condition on Explanation) by Skow, Bradford
Against Understanding (as a Condition on
Explanation)∗
Bradford Skow
1 Understanding as a Condition on Explanation?
It is often said that there is an important relationship between explanation and un-
derstanding. Like so many ideas about explanation, this one makes an appearance
in Carl Hempel’s “Aspects of Scientific Explanation” (1965), the founding docu-
ment of contemporary thinking about the topic. In the second section of that essay
Hempel introduces the Deductive-Nomological Model of explanation, according to
which (I’ll risk the reminder) an explanation of a fact X is a sound argument for X
that essentially contains a law-stating premise. Hempel then writes:
[A] D-N explanation answers the question ‘Why did the explanandum-
phenomenon occur?’ by showing that the phenomenon resulted from
certain particular circumstances, specified in C1, C2, . . . , Ck, in accor-
dance with the laws L1, L2, . . . , Lr. By pointing this out, the argument
shows that, given the particular circumstances and the laws in ques-
tion, the occurrence of the phenomenon was to be expected; and it is in
this sense that the explanation enables us to understand why the phe-
nomenon occurred. (337; original emphasis)
What is going on in this passage? In particular, why did Hempel think it important
to say the things he says in that last sentence? One natural interpretation has Hempel
assuming, in the background, a necessary condition on explanation:
∗To appear in Making Sense of the World: New Essays on the Philosophy of
Understanding, Stephen Grimm, ed., Oxford University Press.
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The Explanation-Understanding Condition: Something E is an explana-
tion of some fact F only if someone who possesses E understands F—at least
in normal circumstances.
Then, this interpretation continues, what Hempel does explicitly in this passage is
assert (it would be too much to call it an argument) that the DN model satisfies the
necessary condition the Explanation-Understanding Condition states.
The Explanation-Understanding Condition, if true, looks like it could be a re-
ally useful tool for evaluating theories of explanation. One basic way to evaluate a
theory of explanation is to “directly check it against your intuitions”: find a body of
fact that the theory counts as an explanation, and ask yourself, is it an explanation?
Or, find an explanation, and then ask yourself, does the theory counts it as an expla-
nation? If the answer to either question is no, that’s a mark against the theory.1 But
it would be nice to have other ways to evaluate a theory, besides directly checking
it against intuitions. The Explanation-Understanding Condition provides another
way. Find a body of fact E that the theory counts as an explanation of F, and check
if someone could possess E without understanding F. If that is possible, then the
theory must be false.2 In this way, it looks like the phenomenon of understanding
can be used as an independent check on theories of explanation.
The Explanation-Understanding Condition has been, and continues to be,
widely accepted. Michael Friedman, for example, in his 1974 paper “Explana-
tion and Scientific Understanding,” asks “What is it about . . . scientific explanations
. . . that [give] us understanding of the world?” (5). A page later he asks again
“what is the relation between phenomena in virtue of which one phenomenon can
constitute an explanation of another, and what is it about this relation that gives
understanding of the explained phenomenon?” (6). Friedman’s questions presup-
pose the Explanation-Understanding Condition. I could go on with examples like
1I take it that this is the method philosophers should call “checking your intu-
itions,” even though my statement of the method never uses the word “intuition”
or any similar word. I realize this is controversial, but that controversy is not rele-
vant here. (I am largely in agreement with Williamson (2008) and Cappelan (2012)
about the role of so-called intuitions in philosophy.)
2Of course, this method involves using your “intuitions” about whether someone
in some hypothetical circumstances understands F.
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this for a long time. Here are two more: in 1984 Elliott Sober asserted that “Ex-
planations afford understanding” (78). In 2003 James Woodward asserted that “It
is a plausible constraint on what an explanation is that it must be something that
provides understanding” (179). (I will have more to say about these authors’ use of
the Explanation-Understanding Condition later.)
I am “against” the Explanation-Understanding Condition. On one interpreta-
tion, the condition is false. On another interpretation, it can’t, after all, be any use
for evaluating theories of explanation.
A certain idea has shadowed philosophical debates about explanation like
an assassin. That idea is that theories of explanation really are, or really should
be, theories of answers to why-questions. I believe in this idea. I believe that all
that philosophers of science should want out of a theory of explanation is a theory
of answers to why-questions. And I hold that thinking about the phenomenon of
understanding is no help at all in evaluating theories of answers to why-questions.
2 Explanations as Answers
No theory of explanation a philosopher has proposed has ever really been a theory
of all kinds of explanation. Instead they have always been, at best, theories of ex-
plaining why. Suppose Smith asks Jones why the moon is waning, and in response
Jones explains why the moon is waning by asserting some propositions (presum-
ably about, among other things, the earth’s and moon’s orbits). The DN model,
and every theory that has followed, can be read as aiming to say something about
what it took for Jones to have succeeded in explaining (to Smith) why the moon is
waning. But now suppose that Smith asks Jones what a gene is, and in response
Jones explains what a gene is by asserting some propositions (presumably about
inheritance, maybe also about chromosomes and DNA). There is no way to read ei-
ther the DN model or any theory of explanation that has followed as aiming to say
anything about what it took for Jones to have succeeded in explaining (to Smith)
what a gene is.
I said in the last paragraph that every theory of explanation since the DN
model can be read as a theory of explaining why. That’s not entirely true. Bas Van
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Fraassen’s theory of explanation, in The Scientific Image (1980), can’t. His theory
takes the form of a theory of why-questions and their answers. That’s not the same
thing as a theory of explaining why. Assuming that the “canonical form” of an
answer to the question why Q is something of the form “Q because R,”3 a theory of
answers to why-questions will fill in the schema
(S1) Q because R iff . . .
A theory of explaining why, by contrast, will fill in the schema
(S2) Person P1 explained (to person P2) why Q iff . . .
Since explaining is a speech act, to complete (S2) is to lay down the conditions
required for someone to have successfully carried out this speech act. One does not
have to lay down such conditions to complete (S1).
What I just said might suggest that a theory of explaining why must do “more”
than a theory of answers to why-questions, in the sense that a theory of explaining
why must contain a theory of answers to why-questions as a part. This suggestion
is not true. A theory of explaining why will certainly make use of the notion of
an answer to a why-question. But it can do this without containing, or entailing,
any particular theory of answers to why-questions. In support of this, here is how I
think the true theory of explaining why, the true completion of (S2), will start:
(S3) P1 explained to P2 why Q iff P1 told P2 the answer to the question why Q in
the following way/manner: . . . .
Right there after “told P2” is the reference to the answer to the question why Q. But
(S3), while it mentions answers to why-questions, doesn’t contain a theory of such
answers. Of course (S3) is not itself a theory; it trails off into ellipsis. But I don’t
think that the true completion of (S3) will contain a theory of such answers either.
The stuff that comes after “way/manner” will (obviously) specify a way of telling
3Certainly not all answers have this form; the answer to the question why that
plant is closing its stomata may be that it is doing this in order to conserve water.
I happen to believe that every “in order to” answer—sometimes called teleological
answers—is equivalent to a because-answer, but will not defend this claim here. (I
defend it in chapter 6 of (Skow 2016).)
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someone a proposition, but I can’t think of any way of specifying a way of telling
that involves stating a theory of answers to why-questions.
When Van Fraassen proposed his theory of explanation, which, again, was
a theory of why-questions, he did not say that the criteria for judging his theory
were different from those for judging earlier theories of explanation, like the DN
model. But if his is a theory of why-questions and their answers, while earlier
theories were theories of explaining why, shouldn’t the criteria be different? The
answer to this question would be yes—if the question’s presupposition, that earlier
theories were theories of explaining why, were true. The fact that Van Fraassen
did not say that his theory should be judged on different criteria is some evidence
that he, at least, thought that this presupposition was false. Anyway, it is my view
that the presupposition is false. Although earlier theories can be read as theories
of explaining why, I don’t think they should be read that way. I don’t think they’re
best interpreted that way. It’s not only Van Fraassen’s theory of explanation that is
really a theory of answers to why-questions; that’s what all of them really are.4
I don’t take these observations to be terribly novel or even all that revolution-
ary. They’ve been around in some form or another from the beginning: Hempel
himself says that explanations are answers to why-questions.5 But even if the idea
that philosophers of science should really be after a theory of answers to why-
questions is in fact widely accepted, it is not really taken to heart. For philosophers
4There are some exceptions. For example, Achinstein is explicit that the theory
he presents in (Achinstein 1983) is a theory of the speech act of explaining. I think
this makes his theory a kind of theory that philosophy of science should not be
interested in. I will defend this claim below.
5However, Hempel did not say that every answer to a why-question was an ex-
planation; he isolated (or tried to isolate) a special class of why-questions that he
called “explanation-seeking” (see Hempel 1965: 335). I argue against the existence
of such a special class, and defend more generally the idea that theories of explana-
tion really are, or at least should be read as, theories of answers to why-questions,
in chapter 2 of (Skow 2016).
Some of the distinctions I’ve been drawing were first drawn by Bromberger, in
the 1960’s. He observed that one can explain things other than answers to why-
questions, and emphasized that explaining an answer is different from telling some-
one the answer; see the papers collected in (Bromberger 1992).
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rarely phrase their theories as theories of answers to why-questions. They phrase
them as theories of explanation, phrasing them as completions of one of the follow-
ing:
• Fact X explains fact Y iff . . .
• Fact X is an explanation of fact Y iff . . .
At one level this is just a matter of terminology: there is, I think, a well-established
practice of using the noun “explanation,” in some contexts at least, as a general
term for answers to why-questions (only). In some contexts, “I was confused about
the photoelectric effect; then Professor Smith gave me the explanation” means “I
was confused about why the photoelectric effect happens; then professor Smith
told me (the answer to the question) why the photoelectric effect happens.” Still,
over-use of the word “explanation” can seduce us into false claims and mislead us
into accepting bad arguments. The Explanation-Understanding Condition is a good
example of this.
3 Against the Explanation-Understanding Condition
Here is the Condition again:
Something E is an explanation of some fact F only if someone who possesses
E understands F—at least in normal circumstances.
Is this right? That depends on how it is interpreted. The first thing we need to do,
to make it more precise, is to re-word it so that it does not speak of facts as the
things that are explained, or understood. We do talk of explaining or understanding
facts, but it is misleading to talk this way in this context. An explanation of the fact
that the moon is waning is, in this context, just an explanation of why the moon is
waning. Similarly, to understand the fact that the moon is waning is, in this context,
to understand why the moon is waning. So let’s make the “why”s that belong in the
statement of the Explanation-Understanding Condition explicit (from now on I’m
going to leave off the qualification about normal circumstances):
(EU) Something E is an explanation of why Q only if someone who possesses E
understands why Q.
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Now I want to distinguish two readings of (EU). One reading takes “explanation of
why Q,” as it appears in (EU), to mean nothing more than “answer to the question
why Q.” Another reading takes talk of an “explanation of why Q” to be talk of acts
of performing the speech act of explaining.
Here is the first reading:
(EU1) A proposition P is the answer to the question why Q only if anyone who
knows P understands why Q.
I should note that to get (EU1) from (EU) I did more than replace reference to an
explanation with reference to an answer. There’s another difficult bit of wording in
(EU): it speaks of “possessing” an explanation. Once we eliminate “explanation,”
we are left with talk of someone “possessing” an answer to a why-question. But
what is it to “possess” an answer to a why-question? The most natural thought is
that possessing an answer is just knowing that answer.
Now we have one interpretation of the Explanation-Understanding Condition.
Do we have in it an interesting constraint on theories of answers to why-questions?
I don’t think so, because I don’t think (EU1) is even true. Since knowing why Q is
the same thing as knowing the proposition that is the answer to the question why Q,
(EU1) amounts to saying that knowing why Q is sufficient for understanding why
Q. But this claim is false. Understanding is a greater achievement than knowledge,
not a lesser one.
Consider, for example, Lester. Lester has never taken a chemistry class, or
studied the subject on his own. But like all of us he has heard people use the words
“acid” and “base,” and words related to them, like “acidic.” He has heard people say
things like “Lemon juice is acidic,” and “Baking soda is basic.” He’s had enough
exposure to these words for them to be part of his vocabulary. For example, when
he called his doctor recently with a stomach ache, and she asked him if he’s had
anything acidic to eat or drink recently, he understood her question, and replied that
he had had some orange juice earlier in the evening. Now the other day Lester’s
niece was showing him the lab experiment she’d done in her chemistry class. She
dipped a piece of litmus paper into a liquid, and it turned red. Lester was very
curious about this result. “Why did the litmus paper turn red?” he asked her niece.
“Because this stuff I dipped it into is an acid” she replied.
7
Here Lester’s niece told him the correct answer to the why-question he asked.
Moreover, she knew that that was the correct answer, having studied this experiment
in her chemistry class. Furthermore, Lester has no reason to doubt her testimony.
So after hearing his niece’s answer Lester knew that the paper turned red because
it was dipped it in acid. In other words, Lester knew why the litmus paper turned
red. But, I claim, he did not understand why the litmus paper turned red. This is a
counterexample to (EU1).
What more would it take for Lester to understand why the litmus paper turned
red? I am not really sure. It doesn’t really matter for what is to follow. But for what
it is worth, here is some speculation. One possibility is that Lester needs more
knowledge. He needs to know more than just the answer to the question why the
litmus paper turned red in order to understand why the litmus paper turned red.
Maybe what he needs to know, in addition, is some chemistry. More specifically,
maybe he needs to know something about why dipping litmus paper into acids turns
it red. If he knew that, he would know something about the “connection” between
the event the why-question concerns (the color-change), and the fact offered in the
answer to that why-question (that the paper was dipped in acid). And this is not
just any old connection; instead, it appears to be the connection in virtue of which
that answer counts as the answer. That is, the fact that acid causes litmus paper
to turn red via such-and-such chemical process appears to be the (or at least an)
answer to the question “Why is it true that the paper turned red because it was
dipped in acid?” If these speculations are on the right track, then they suggest
a generalization: maybe, in general, understanding why Q requires not just that
one know the proposition that is the answer to the question why Q, but also know
something about why that proposition is the answer. In terminology I introduce in
(Skow 2016), the claim is that understanding why Q requires not just knowing some
or all of the reasons why Q, but also knowing why those reasons are reasons.6
6Stephen Grimm holds that understanding why E happened requires knowing,
not just that C (a cause of E) happened, but also knowing something about the
“modal relationship” between C and E (Grimm 2014). It may be that the connec-
tion between C and E in virtue of which “because C happened” is the answer to the
question why E happened just is the modal connection Grimm focuses on. But I
will not pause here for a detailed comparison of the two views. Michael Strevens
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So the first interpretation of (EU), namely (EU1), is not a principle that can be
used to evaluate theories of answers to why-questions, because it is false. I turn now
to a second interpretation of (EU). This interpretation focuses, not on the answer to
the question why Q, but on the act of explaining why Q. It interprets (EU) as stating
a necessary condition on having performed this speech act. Here is one way to state
this condition:
(EU2) Person P1 explained to P2 why Q only if, as a result of what P1 did, P2
understood why Q.
What (EU2) is saying is that to count as having explained to P2 why Q, as opposed
to, say, telling P2 why Q, one must do more than get him to believe the answer to the
question why Q. What more that is (EU2) does not say—except that it is whatever
it takes for P2 to end up understanding why Q.
So is (EU2) right? I honestly have no idea. I can see reasons to doubt it.
There are plenty of principles that compete with it. Here are a few:
(EK) P1 explained to P2 why Q only if, as a result of what P1 did, P2 knew why Q.
(EP) P1 explained to P2 why Q only if, as a result of what P1 did, P2 was in a
position to know why Q.
When I say that these principles compete with (EU2) I don’t mean that they are in-
compatible with (EU2); in fact, assuming that understanding why Q entails knowing
why Q, (EU2) entails each of them. They compete with (EU2) not for truth, but for
acceptance. Maybe having one’s audience (merely) know why Q is the strongest
(relevant) necessary condition on successfully explaining why Q; maybe one’s au-
dience doesn’t also need to have achieved so much as having come to understand
why Q.
holds that understanding why E happened requires directly mentally apprehend-
ing the explanation of E, where knowing a proposition is not sufficient for directly
mentally apprehending it (Strevens 2013). If we assume that “the explanation of
E” here denotes the answer to the question why E happened, then I disagree; one
need not directly mentally apprehend the answer, but one does need to know other
propositions in addition to the answer.
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When I compare (EU2) to (EK) and (EP), I just don’t know how I would go
about choosing between them.
But I also think it doesn’t matter. What reason does a philosopher of science
have to care whether (EU2), rather than one of the others, is true? The people who
have reason to care are philosophers who aim to have a theory of the speech act of
explaining. But, as I argued above, that’s not what philosophers have been looking
for under the heading of a theory of explanation.
Of course, it’s possible that while philosophers of science haven’t been look-
ing for a theory of the speech act of explaining, they should have been.
Now if philosophers of science should be looking for a theory of explaining,
that must be because a complete philosophy of science requires such a theory. But
in fact I think that a complete philosophy of science shouldn’t include a theory of
explaining.
A complete philosophy of science would have to include a theory of explain-
ing if, but only if, explaining were in some way part of the nature of science. Now
we do sometimes say things that suggest that it is. Some philosophers say that one
of the aims of science is to explain why things happen. They say this in opposition
to those who say that science aims to provide (just) a comprehensive description of
what happens. Whether they are right is contentious; this debate is part of the debate
over “scientific realism.” But just what claim is it that the debate is about? Does
“science aims to explain why things happen” mean just “science aims to answer
why-questions,” or does it mean “science aims to inform the public (or whomever),
by means of performing the speech act of explaining, why things happen”? Once
this distinction is made, I think it’s obvious that only the first interpretation has a
chance of being true. Or I should say, it is only the first interpretation the scientific
realists mean to affirm.
What exactly is scientific realism? It doesn’t seem to be the same thing to
everyone. But certain doctrines appear to be central: the doctrine that our current
scientific theories are close to being true; the doctrine that it is a constitutive aim
of science, as a practice, to produce true theories; and—I think—the doctrine that
it is a constitutive aim of science to produce theories that are not just true, but also
contain answers to why-questions. But I just can’t see why anyone would think it
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was a constitutive aim of science that its practitioners perform any particular speech
acts.
Couldn’t a mute Robinson Crusoe have been an excellent scientist? Maybe
he finds himself alone in Geneva in a post-apocalyptic world. He fixes up the Large
Hadron Collider and does a bunch of experiments. He improves on the current
formulation of quantum field theory, devising a theory that is closer to the truth.
He discovers the answer to the question why electrons, or Higgs bosons, do this or
that. But he never says anything (not to anyone else, there being no one else there,
and not to himself either). He never performs any speech acts. In particular, he
never explains anything to anyone. Would any scientific realist really maintain that
Crusoe was in some way defective as a scientist—that he was failing to pursue all
of the aims of science?
Let’s take stock. I distinguished two readings of the Explanation-Understanding
Condition. One reading, (EU1), says that some fact about understanding is a nec-
essary condition on something’s being an answer to a why-question. But (EU1) is
false. The other reading, (EU2), says that some fact about understanding is a nec-
essary condition on someone’s having (successfully) performed the speech act of
explaining. Maybe (EU2) is true, but whether it is is of no interest to the philoso-
phy of science.
4 An Example: Sober On Explanation and Causation
What I want to do next is look at a few examples of philosophers invoking the
Explanation-Understanding Condition. We are now in a position to see the mistakes
these invocations have led to.
I selected the examples to look at from important works in the philosophy
of science, but the selection was otherwise random. There are a great deal more I
could have looked at.
In his 1984 book The Nature of Selection Elliott Sober took up the question
of whether an organism’s fitness causes, or explains, its survival. This led him to
a discussion of whether a disposition, say a sugar cube’s being soluble, causes, or
explains, its manifestation (the sugar cube’s dissolving). Sober accepted that the
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solubility causes the dissolving, but claimed that “we feel somewhat disappointed
when told that the sugar lump dissolved in water because it was water-soluble”
(77). Being told that the sugar lump is water-soluble is satisfying when we have
asked what caused it to dissolve, but is (in his words) “disappointing” when we
have asked why it dissolved. To reconcile the claim that the solubility is a cause
with the claim that citing is does not make for a “satisfying” explanation, Sober set
out to “disentangle issues of causation from issues of explanation”:
Consider the question “What caused Y?” One correct answer would be
“the cause of Y.” However, this answer might rightly be classified as un-
explanatory, since it does not provide us with any better understanding
of why Y occurred than we started with. Explanations afford under-
standing; therefore, claims asserting that X explains Y are true or false
partly because of the relation of those two terms to a third—namely,
us. Causality is not similarly “consciousness-dependent.” Whether or
not X caused Y is not in general influenced by whether we might find
it interesting to be told this. (1984, 78; original italics)
Let’s look closely at the argument Sober is offering. Here it is as he stated it:
1. “Explanations afford understanding.”
2. “Therefore, claims asserting that X explains Y are true or false partly because
of the relation of those two terms to a third—namely, us.”
3. “Causality is not similarly ‘consciousness-dependent.’ ”
4. [Implicit conclusion:] It is false that, or at least not always true that, if X is a
cause of Y, then X explains Y.
I don’t think that this is a very good argument. Its problems start with line 1. Line
1 is a version of the Explanation-Understanding Condition. I have proposed two
readings of this condition. But the first reading, (EU1), is false, and the second,
(EU2), is not an interesting thesis (from the perspective of the philosophy of science
anyway). So the first premise of Sober’s argument is either false or uninteresting.
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The charge of uninterestingness might seem itself uninteresting. Surely what
matters is how interesting Sober’s conclusion is, not how interesting his premises
are. So before dismissing the reading of Sober’s argument that takes line 1 to be
(EU2), we should at least see what the argument’s conclusion looks like on that
reading.
Since (EU2) comes from (EU) by interpreting talk of explanations as talk of
the speech act of explaining, we should interpret line 4 to also make a claim about
the speech act of explaining. Here is one stab at an interpretation of line 4 like that:7
4*. The following is false: for any term Z (name or description) denoting a
cause of E, someone can explain to someone else why E happened by saying
pE happened because Z happenedq.
I think that 4* may well be true, but that whatever interest it has does not essentially
depend on its focus on the speech act of explaining. Here is how I would put the
thought main Sober wants to get at in the quoted passage above, that 4* seeks to
capture: if I ask you why some event E happened, and you reply that E happened
because its cause happened (let’s pretend that E has only one relevant cause), you
will have failed in some way to respond to my question appropriately.
Now I can see a route one might try to take from this claim to an interest-
ing conclusion, a conclusion about what can and cannot be an answer to a why-
question. Here is how it goes, starting from the claim I ended the last paragraph
with:
5. If, in response to the question why E happened, someone X responds by
asserting that E happened because its cause happened, then X will have given
a bad response to the question.
6. If, by asserting P, someone gives a bad response to a question, then P is not
an answer to that question.
7. So the proposition that E happened because its cause happened is not an an-
swer to the question why E happened.
7I’ve had to promote one schematic letter to a variable; I’ve also changed which
letters I use for schematic letters/variables to make the conclusion easier to read.
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8. So even though the cause of E is a cause of E, it is false that E happened
because its cause happened; the schema “if Z is a cause of E, then E happened
because Z happened” has false instances.
I want to make two points about this argument. The first is about who this argu-
ment is supposed to target. Elsewhere in his book Sober takes issue with the thesis
that to answer the question why E happened one must cite, or describe, causes of
E. The argument (5)–(8), if sound, would show this thesis to be false, under one
interpretation. That interpretation says that pE happened because Rq is true if and
only if the sentence R in some sense describes the occurrence of a cause of E. But
this does not seem to me a strong point against those who think that answers must
cite or describe causes. They will just opt for a weaker interpretation of their thesis;
they will find a principled way to restrict which descriptions of the occurrences of
E’s causes are allowed as values of R.
My second point is that the argument’s premise 6 is false. Asserting P can be
a bad response even if P is an answer. How? Here is one way. It could be that P,
while an answer, is not the answer the asker is looking for. I might watch a window
break after being hit by a rock,8 but not know whether the window was fragile, or
whether instead it was made out of super-glass that had just one point of weakness,
the point where the rock was lucky enough to hit. I ask why the window broke. If
you tell me that it broke because it was hit by a rock, that’s a bad response. But the
problem with it is not that what you said was false. “Because it was hit by a rock”
is true, and is (therefore) an answer to the question why the window broke. The
problem with your response is, instead, that it was not the answer I was looking for.
The point can be made without using a why-question as an example. For any
question, there are many true answers to that question which it would be wrong to
assert when asked that question. Suppose you and I are in some Boston greenspace
or other, but I, being from out of town, don’t know which. Are we on the Common,
or in the Public Garden, or what? I asked you where we are. If you reply “We
are in Boston,” you give a true answer to the question “Where are we?” But it was
wrong of you to assert that answer. It’s not the answer I was looking for. Similarly,
8After the window is hit by a rock, that is.
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suppose I ask you who came to the party, and you answer “the people who came to
the party came to the party.” You haven’t said something false. You’ve given me
an answer to my question. But it’s an answer I already knew. It’s not the answer I
wanted.
This could be what is going on with the response Sober is interested in, the
response to the question why E happened that one gives by saying “E happened
because its cause happened.” That’s certainly a bad response; but it could be bad not
because it’s not an answer, but only because it’s not the answer the asker wanted. If
this is right, then Sober’s observation that it would be bad to say “because its cause
happened” in response to the question of why E happened does not show that there
is any restriction on what descriptions of E’s causes can appear in an answer to the
question why E happened.
I have said that “We are in Boston” and “The people who came to the party
came to the party” are correct answers to the relevant questions. This might be
challenged. (I believe there are theories of questions and answers on which they are
not answers.) But I don’t think Sober is in a position to challenge them. He accepts,
right at the beginning of the long quotation above, that “The cause of E” is a correct
answer to “What caused E?”.
To sum up: Sober, in the quoted passage, tried to use a connection between
explanation and understanding to reach a conclusion about when descriptions of the
causes of E can, and cannot, constitute explanations of the occurrence of E. I have
argued that his argument was based on a false claim about the connection between
explanation and understanding, and also sketched a way that someone who thinks
that any description of the causes of E can appear in an answer to the question why
E happened can resist his conclusion.
5 Another Example: Woodward Against the DN Model
We saw Hempel claim that the DN model satisfies the Explanation-Understanding
Condition. In Making Things Happen James Woodward turns this around: he ar-
gues that the DN model is false on the ground that it fails to satisfy the Explanation-
Understanding Condition. Woodward in his argument focuses on explanations that
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do not appear to cite any laws, such as Michael Scriven’s canonical example,
Ink bottle: The carpet is stained because Jones knocked over the ink bottle.9
Hempel’s view about Ink bottle, and other, similar, examples, was, roughly, that
the sentence in Ink bottle is true, even though no law-statements follow the word
“because,” because that sentence, or someone who uses that sentence, in some way
conveys information about the DN argument that is the “ideal” explanation of the
carpet stain. Woodard calls the strategy behind this response “the hidden struc-
ture strategy.” The “hidden structure” is the ideal explanation; it is hidden because
someone could truly assert that the carpet is stained because Jones knocked over
the ink bottle without knowing what laws appear in the ideal DN argument. The
hidden structure strategy is to say that a “because” statement can be true by “con-
veying information” about a structure that is hidden from (not fully known to) the
person asserting that statement, or his audience.
Woodward does not like the hidden structure strategy, and thinks that any the-
ory of explanation that makes use of this strategy will fall afoul of the Explanation-
Understanding Condition. Here is how Woodward puts his argument:
There is yet another reason for rejecting the hidden structure strategy.
This derives from a general point about the epistemology of explana-
tion and the connection between explanation and understanding . . . It is
a plausible constraint on what an explanation is that it must be some-
thing that provides understanding. To say that certain information is
“part” of an explanation or contributes to its explanatory import is
to say that this information contributes to the understanding provided
by the explanation. This in turn imposes an epistemic constraint on
what information can be part of an explanation and can contribute to
its explanatory import: such information must be epistemically acces-
sible to those who use the explanation. Put slightly differently, the
idea is that the features of the explanation that endow it with explana-
tory import—that make it an explanation—must be features that can be
9It became canonical by being quoted at length and discussed by Hempel (1965:
360).
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known or grasped or recognized by those who use the explanation; if
not, it isn’t in virtue of possessing those features that the explanation
produces understanding. On this way of looking at matters, there is
something deeply puzzling about the suggestion that claims like [Ink
bottle] explain or convey understanding in virtue of providing infor-
mation about the existence of some underlying epistemically hidden
structure, whether a DN argument or an ideal explanatory text. The
mere obtaining of this structure, independently of anyone’s awareness
of its existence, cannot be what accounts for people’s judgment that,
for example, the impact of the knee on the desk is explanatorily rele-
vant to the tipping over of the inkwell. If this line of thought is correct,
it seems to follow that to the extent that information about the laws or
structures that underlie singular-causal (or other sorts of causal) claims
is epistemically hidden from those who use such explanations, it cannot
be that this information contributes to the explanatory import of these
explanations. (179-80)
While I agree with Woodward that the DN model is false, I don’t think there is a
good argument against it here in this passage.
Let’s walk through Woodward’s argument slowly. Woodward starts with a
version of the Explanation-Understanding Condition:
1. “It is a plausible constraint on what an explanation is that it must be some-
thing that provides understanding.”
He also asserts a version of this condition about “parts” of explanations:
2. “To say that certain information is ‘part’ of an explanation or contributes
to its explanatory import is to say that this information contributes to the
understanding provided by the explanation.”
Woodward then says that claim 2 “imposes an epistemic constraint on what infor-
mation can be part of an explanation and can contribute to its explanatory import.”
The epistemic constraint that he infers from claim 2 is this:
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3. Information can be part of an explanation and can contribute to its explana-
tory import only if it is “epistemically accessible to those who use the expla-
nation.”
Presumably the argument proceeds from here by appealing to the implicit premise:
4. Plenty of people use, or have used, the explanation in Ink bottle, to whom
no law of nature is epistemically accessible.
The argument’s conclusion then follows from lines 3 and 4:
5. Therefore, no law of nature is part of the explanation in Ink bottle, and no
law of nature contributes to its explanatory import.
How does all this look if we eliminate “explanation” in favor of “answer to a why-
question”? It is not entirely obvious how to translate each of the premises. Here is
one attempt. Line 1 becomes (EU1):
1*. A proposition A is an answer to the question why Q only if someone who
knows A understands why Q.
Line 2 takes line 1 and turns it into a claim about parts of an explanation, so line 2*
should take line 1* and turn it into a claim about parts of an answer:
2*. If P is part of an answer A to the question why Q, then anyone who knows
A−P (“A minus P,” the information left over when P is “subtracted” from A)
understands why Q to a lesser degree than someone who knows (all of) A.
Line 3 required parts of explanations to be epistemically accessible, and was in-
ferred from line 2, so from line 2* we should infer a claim about parts of answers
being epistemically accessible:
3*. If P is part of an answer A to the question why Q, anyone who answers the
question why Q by asserting A knows P.
Let me pause briefly: premise 3 spoke both of being part of an explanation, and
also of contributing to that explanation’s explanatory import. But it’s hard for me to
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see why adding the stuff about explanatory import is needed; how could something
be part of an explanation without contributing to that explanation’s explanatory
import? In terms of answers, how could something be part of an answer without
contributing to that answer? As far as I can tell, it couldn’t. So I’m leaving out the
stuff about explanatory import in the *-ed interpretation of Woodward’s argument.
Let’s continue. There’s one premise left, and then the conclusion. I’ll put the
whole argument here, with the last premise and the conclusion at the end:
1*. A proposition A is an answer to the question why Q only if someone who
knows A understands why Q.
2*. If P is part of an answer A to the question why Q, then anyone who knows
A−P understands why Q to a lesser degree than someone who knows (all of)
A.
3*. (So,) if P is part of an answer A to the question why Q, anyone who answers
the question why Q by asserting A knows P.
4*. Plenty of people who have answered the question why the carpet is stained
by asserting the proposition Ink bottle did not know any law of nature.
5*. Therefore, no law of nature is part of the answer to the question why the
carpet is stained in Ink bottle.
Is Woodward’s argument, interpreted this way, any good? Premise 1*, again, is
(EU1), which I have rejected. That’s enough for the argument to fail. But let’s look
at the rest of it. Maybe there’s a way to fix the argument, so that it doesn’t rely on
1*?
I think there is. The argument’s intermediate conclusion, line 3*, looks plau-
sible to me. Surely if you assert A you know A—or at least this is usually the case.
And if you know A you know (or at least are in a position to know) its parts.
Of course, the idea of a “part” of a proposition is not an ordinary one. It is
some kind of technical notion.10 But the paradigm case must be conjunctions: the
proposition that X is part of the proposition that X and Y. In this case a proposition
10It receives a detailed development in (Yablo 2014).
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entails each of its parts (though not vice versa). Presumably this holds in general:
if P is part of a proposition A, then A entails P. And it is not too wild to assume that
if you know A, and A entails P, you are at least in a position to know P. (Maybe
this looks better if we require you to know that A entails P; but such niceties don’t
matter here.)
So, interestingly, the *-ed version of the argument arrives at a plausible in-
termediate conclusion, line 3*, an intermediate conclusion that, as I have stated
it, says nothing about understanding; this despite the fact that it is reached from
suspect claims about the connection between understanding why Q and being an
answer to the question why Q.
In fact, the rest of the *-ed interpretation of Woodward’s argument goes fine
as well. I think that 4* is true: plenty of people have used Ink bottle without
knowing any laws (or, at least, we can easily consider a hypothetical scenario in
which this is so). And the conclusion 5* follows from 3* and 4*.
Despite all this, there is still a big problem with the *-ed argument. The
problem is not that it is unsound; the problem is that its conclusion is not the con-
clusion Woodward wants. Sophisticated defenders of the DN model, or theories
that descend from the DN model, Peter Railton for example (whose views Wood-
ward discusses at length in the chapter from which I am quoting), do not say that
some law of nature is part of the answer in Ink bottle. They say instead that Ink
bottle is itself only part of a larger and more complete answer, and that that larger
and more complete answer contains laws of nature.11
Is there a better interpretation of Woodward’s argument, an interpretation that
gets him to the right conclusion? Well there is at least a different interpretation; let
us see if it is better.
If you look back at the long quotation above, you will see that after Woodward
drew the intermediate conclusion 3 he wrote
Put slightly differently, the idea is that the features of the explanation
that endow it with explanatory import—that make it an explanation—
must be features that can be known or grasped or recognized by those
11See, for example, (Railton 1981).
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who use the explanation; if not, it isn’t in virtue of possessing those
features that the explanation produces understanding.
I actually do not think that this is conclusion 3 “put slightly differently.” I think that
this is a very different idea. To ask what features of an explanation endow it with
explanatory import, or to ask what features make it an explanation, sounds, to me,
like asking why it is an explanation. If we focus, as we should, on answers to why-
questions, not explanation, the question we are attending to becomes the question of
why a given answer to a why-question is an answer. What do Woodward’s remarks
suggest about the answer to this question? Here’s what I think they suggest:
6. If P is the answer to the question of why is it that R is the answer to the
question why Q, then anyone who asserts R as an answer to the question why
Q must be in a position to know P.
Here P, the answer to the question of why R is the answer to the question why Q,
describes the “features of the explanation”—that is, the answer—“that make it an
explanation,” or answer.
Unlike claim 3*, claim 6 can get us to the conclusion Woodward wants—if it
is true. Let’s first see how it gets Woodward where he wants to go, and then turn to
the question of whether it is true.
The argument from 6 against the DN model is, I think, straightforward. We
need just two more premises:
7. If the DN model is correct, then some law of nature is (at least part of) the
answer to the question of why Ink bottle is the answer to the question why
the carpet is stained.
8. Plenty of people who have answered the question why the carpet is stained by
asserting the proposition Ink bottle did not know (and were not in a position
to know) any law of nature. (This is premise 4* from the *-ed argument,
slightly revised.)
From 6, 7, and 8, the desired conclusion follows:
9. The DN model is not correct.
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What about premises 7 and 8? Line 8 is certainly plausible, for the same reason that
premise 4* from the *-ed argument was. I myself don’t know of any laws of nature
that could be added to Ink Bottle to turn it into a DN argument. The plausibility
of line 7 is harder to assess. Rather than dwelling on line 7, though, I will skip to
the end: ultimately this argument does not succeed, because its crucial premise, 6,
is false.
At least that’s what I think. I think that someone could know the answer to
the question why Q, and could tell someone who wants to know why Q that answer,
without having any idea why that answer is the answer.
Suppose Jones is on a tour of the Old Mill. The tour guide points to some
charred wood, and says that these are the parts of the mill that burned in the fire of
’03. Jones asks why the mill caught on fire in ’03. The tour guide replies that it
caught on fire because it was struck by lightning. Jones then persists in his ques-
tioning. He says, “that’s great, but I have another question. Why is that the answer?
Why is it that ‘because it was struck by lightning’ is the answer to the question of
why the mill caught on fire?” The tour guide is baﬄed, and a little annoyed. “I
don’t know” he says. He gives Jones a look to get him to shut up. Still, despite not
knowing the answer to Jones’ second question, the tour guide knew why the mill
caught on fire. He also successfully told Jones why the mill caught on fire.
It is important to distinguish the baﬄing question Jones asked from another
one. Jones did not ask why the answer is true. If, after the tour guide had said “be-
cause it was struck by lightning,” Jones had said, as my two-year-old automatically
says in response to pretty much everything I say, “Why?”, we would most naturally
take him to be asking why the mill was struck by lightning. To ask that is to ask why
the tour guide’s answer is true. That’s not the same as asking why it is an answer.
I extracted premise 6 from some things Woodward said. But he didn’t just
say some things that suggested 6; he also offered a little argument for those things.
Maybe 6 will seem more plausible if we look at that argument? Here, again, is what
Woodward wrote; I’ve italicized the relevant bit:
the idea is that the features of the explanation that endow it with ex-
planatory import—that make it an explanation—must be features that
can be known or grasped or recognized by those who use the expla-
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nation; if not, it isn’t in virtue of possessing those features that the
explanation produces understanding.
This argument is worthy of our attention not just because Woodward offers it, but
also because it appeals to a connection between explanation and understanding, and
such connections are the main concern of this paper. So what is the argument? I
think it is a good idea to start by making the argument more explicit using Wood-
ward’s own terminology, before trying to see how to put it as an argument for 6.
Here is what the argument seems to me to be:
10. The features of an explanation that make it an explanation are (also) features
in virtue of which that explanation produces understanding.
11. The features of an explanation in virtue of which it produces understanding
are features that those who use that explanation can know it to have.
12. Therefore, the features of an explanation that make it an explanation are fea-
tures that those who use that explanation can know it to have.
The conclusion 12, of course, corresponds to premise 6 of the earlier argument:
6. If P is the answer to the question of why is it that R is the answer to the
question why Q, then anyone who asserts R as an answer to the question why
Q must be in a position to know P.
What we need to do is “translate” lines 10 and 11 so that they can serve as premises
in an argument for 6. I don’t think this is hard to do, in light of my earlier dis-
cussions of what could be meant by “explanation produces understanding,” and my
earlier claim that “X in virtue of W” can be rendered as “W is the answer to the
question why X.” I’ll label the translations of lines 10 and 11 with *s:
10*. If P is the answer to the question of why is it that R is the answer to the
question why Q, then P is the answer to the question of why anyone who
knows R understands why Q.
11*. If P is the answer to the question of why anyone who knows R understands
why Q, then anyone who offers R as an answer to the question why Q is in a
position to know P.
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6. (Therefore, ) if P is the answer to the question of why is it that R is the answer
to the question why Q, then anyone who asserts R as an answer to the question
why Q must be in a position to know P.
This argument is valid, but the premises 10* and 11* don’t seem to me to have
anything going for them. Start with 10*: the problem with it is that it presupposes
that it is true that anyone who knows the answer to the question why Q understands
why Q. I’ve said why I think this is false. I also don’t see much reason to accept
premise 11*. I can see no reason to think that you can only answer a why-question
if you know why the answer you’re giving produces understanding in those who
hear it.
I have been examining Woodard’s argument that the DN model fails to respect
some connection between explanation and understanding. I found two different
arguments that Woodward might have been giving; I have argued that both of them
fail.
6 Conclusion
The idea that there is an important connection between explanation and understand-
ing is a common one. The alleged connection, vaguely stated, is that explanations
produce understanding. If it existed, this connection would open up a new avenue
for searching for the true theory of explanation: just investigate what things produce
understanding. But I think that the promise that comes with this alleged connection
is not fulfilled. On one precisification of the vague idea, the connection does not
exist—knowing the answer to the question of why some event E happened is not
sufficient for understanding why it happened. On another precisification the con-
nection is this: someone has performed the speech act of explaining with respect
to the question of why E happened only if their audience came to understand why
it happened. Maybe so, but a theory of this speech act is not what philosophers of
science have been after under the heading “theory of explanation.”
After all this negativity I want to draw attention to the fact that my title is
not “Against Understanding.” While I have opposed a certain use of the notion
of understanding in theorizing about answers to why-questions, I do not think that
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it is a useless notion for other purposes, or that the question of what it takes to
understand why some event E happened is not itself independently philosophically
interesting. In fact at least one place where the notion of understanding may be
important is not hard to find. I said earlier that one of the aims of science is to
answer why-questions (at least, according to some scientific realists). But it is
plausible that science aims at more. Certainly science aims not just to “have” the
answer to the question of, for example, why the dinosaurs went extinct, in some
thin sense of “have,” where believing it on very weak evidence is enough. Science
aims to know why the dinosaurs went extinct. But even this might undersell how
lofty the aims of science are. I find it plausible that science aims to understand why
the dinosaurs went extinct; more generally, it aims, for all the facts F in its domain,
to understand why F obtains. Even if we do not need to understand understanding
in order to figure out what it takes to be an answer to a why-question, we do need
to if we want to understand science.12
References
Achinstein, Peter (1983). The Nature of Explanation. Oxford University Press.
Bromberger, Sylvain (1992). On What We Know We Don’t Know. The University
of Chicago Press and CSLI.
Cappelen, Herman (2012). Philosophy Without Intuitions. Oxford University Press.
Friedman, Michael (1974). “Explanation and Scientific Understanding.” The Jour-
nal of Philosophy 71: 5-19.
Grimm, Stephen. “Understanding as Knowledge of Causes.” in A. Fairweather
(ed.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology
and Philosophy of Science. Springer: 329-345.
Hempel, Carl (1965). “Aspects of Scientific Explanation.” In Aspects of Scientific
Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. The Free Press.
Railton, Peter (1981). “Probability, Explanation, and Information.” Synthese 48:
233-256.
Sober, Elliott (1984). The Nature of Selection. University of Chicago Press.
12I’d like to thank Fred Feldman for discussing this material with me.
25
Skow, Bradford (2016). Reasons Why. Oxford University Press.
Strevens, Michael (2013). “No Understanding Without Explanation.” Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science 44: 510-515.
Van Fraassen, Bas C. (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford University Press.
Williamson, Timothy (2008). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
Woodward, James (2003). Making Things Happen. Oxford University Press.
Yablo, Stephen (2014). Aboutness. Princeton University Press.
26
